Short-Term Investments and Indices of Risk by Heller, Yuval & Schreiber, Amnon
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Short-Term Investments and Indices of
Risk
Yuval Heller and Amnon Schreiber
Bar-Ilan University, Bar-Ilan University
30 August 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/95791/
MPRA Paper No. 95791, posted 11 September 2019 07:20 UTC
Short-Term Investments and Indices of Risk
Yuval Heller∗ and Amnon Schreiber†‡
August 30, 2019
Abstract
We study various decision problems regarding short-term investments in risky
assets whose returns evolve continuously in time. We show that in each problem, all
risk-averse decision makers have the same (problem-dependent) ranking over short-
term risky assets. Moreover, in each of these problems, the ranking is represented by
the same risk index as in the case of CARA utility agents and normally distributed
risky assets.
JEL Classification: D81, G32.
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1 Introduction
We study various decision problems regarding investments in risky assets (henceforth,
gambles), such as whether to accept a gamble, or how to choose the optimal capital
allocation. To rank the desirability of gambles with respect to the relevant decision
problem, it is often helpful to use an objective riskiness index that is independent of
any specific subjective utility. For example, an objective riskiness index is needed when
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pension funds are required not to exceed a stated level of riskiness (see, e.g., the discussion
in Aumann & Serrano, 2008, p. 812).
In this paper, we analyze four decision problems that are important in various economic
settings. In general, different risk-averse agents rank the desirability of gambles differently.
However, our main result shows that in each of these four problems, all risk-averse agents
have the same (problem-dependent) ranking over short-term investments in risky assets
whose returns evolve continuously in time. Moreover, in each of these problems, the
ranking is represented by the same risk index obtained in the commonly used mean-
variance preferences (e.g., Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964), which are induced by CARA
utility agents and normally distributed gambles.
Brief Description of the Model We consider an agent who has to make an invest-
ment decision related to a gamble. We think of a gamble as the additive return on a
financial investment. We assume that the agent has (1) an initial wealth w, and (2) a
von Neumann–Morgenstern utility u that is increasing and risk-averse (i.e, u′ > 0 and
u′′ < 0). We assume that a gamble is represented by a random variable with (1) positive
expectation, and (2) some negative values in its support. For each problem the agents’
choices are modeled by a decision function that assigns a number to each agent and each
gamble, where a higher number is interpreted as the agent finding the gamble to be more
attractive (i.e., less risky) for the relevant decision problem.
We study four specific decision problems in the paper: (1) acceptance/rejection, in
which the agent faces a binary choice between accepting and rejecting the gamble (e.g.,
Hart, 2011); (2) capital allocation, in which the agent has a continuous choice of how much
to invest in the gamble (e.g., Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964; Landsberger & Meilijson,
1993); (3) the optimal certainty equivalent, in which the agent evaluates how much an
opportunity to invest in the gamble (according to the optimal investment level) is worth
to the agent (e.g., Hellman & Schreiber, 2018); and (4) risk premium, in which the agent
evaluates how much investing in the gamble is inferior to obtaining the gamble’s expected
payoff (Arrow, 1970).1
A risk index is a function that assigns to each gamble a nonnegative number, which
is interpreted as the gamble’s riskiness. We say that a risk index is consistent with a
1We use the expression “risk premium” in its common acceptation in the economic literature since
Arrow (1970). In the financial literature (and in practice), the “risk premium” of a security commonly has
a somewhat different meaning, namely, the security return less the risk-free interest rate (e.g., Cochrane,
2009).
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decision function f over some set of agents and gambles, if each agent in the set ranks all
gambles in the set according to that risk index; that is, f assigns for each agent a higher
value for gamble g than for gamble g′ iff the risk index assigns a lower value to g.
A risk-aversion index is a function that assigns to each agent a non-negative number,
which is interpreted as the agent’s risk aversion. We say that a risk-aversion index is
consistent with a decision function over some set of agents and gambles, if for each gamble
and each pair of agents in the set, the agent with the higher index of risk-aversion invests
less in the gamble than the other agent.
Summary of Results Agents, typically, have heterogeneous rankings of gambles, and,
thus, no risk index (nor risk-aversion index) can be consistent with the rankings of all
agents, unless one restricts the set of gambles. Our main result restricts the set of gam-
bles to assets whose returns evolve continuously in time, where the local uncertainty is
induced by a Wiener process. Specifically, we focus on Ito processes which are continuous-
time Markov processes. The class of Ito processes, is commonly used in economic and
financial applications and includes, in particular, the geometric Brownian motion and
mean-reverting processes (e.g., Merton, 1992).2
Our main result shows that in each of the four decision problems discussed above, all
agents rank all gambles in the same (problem-dependent) way when they have to decide
on short-term investments in gambles whose returns evolve continuously in time. More-
over, the risk indices that are consistent with these decision functions are the same as in
the classic model of agents with CARA (exponential) utilities and normally distributed
gambles. Specifically, we show that: (1) the variance-to-mean index QVM (g) = σ
2[g]
E[g] is
consistent with both the capital allocation function and the acceptance/rejection func-
tion, (2) the inverse Sharpe index QIS (g) = σ[g]E[g] is consistent with the optimal certainty
equivalent function, and (3) the standard deviation index QSD (g) = σ [g] is consistent
with the risk premium function. Finally, we adapt the classic results of Pratt (1964) and
Arrow (1970) to the present setup, and show that the local Arrow–Pratt coefficient of
absolute risk aversion ρ (u,w) = −u′′(w)
u′(w) is consistent with all four decision functions.
Related Literature and Contribution In two influential papers, Aumann & Serrano
(2008) and Foster & Hart (2009) presented two “objective” indices of riskiness of gambles,
2Section 4.5 demonstrates that our results cannot be extended to continuous-time processes with
jumps.
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which are independent of the subjective utility of the agent. These indices are either
based on reasonable axioms that an index of risk should satisfy (e.g., Artzner et al., 1999;
Aumann & Serrano, 2008; Cherny & Madan, 2009; Foster & Hart, 2013; Schreiber, 2014;
Hellman & Schreiber, 2018; see also the recent survey of Föllmer & Weber, 2015), or they
are based on an “operative” criterion such as an agent never going bankrupt when relying
on an index of risk in deciding whether to accept a gamble (Foster & Hart, 2009; and
see also Meilijson, 2009 , for a discussion of operative implication of Aumann & Serrano’s
index of risk).3
We argue that risk is a multidimensional attribute that crucially depends on the
investment problem. Different aspects of risk are relevant when an agent has to decide
whether to accept a gamble, compared with a situation in which an agent has to choose
how much to invest in a gamble, or has to evaluate the certainty equivalent of the optimal
investment. Many existing papers focus on a single decision function (arguably, the
acceptance/rejection decision has been prominent in the recent literature). By contrast,
we suggest a framework for studying various decision problems, and associate each such
problem with its relevant index of risk. We believe that this general framework may be
helpful in future research on risk indices.
In general, different agents make different investment decisions, based on the subjective
utility of each agent. Thus, a single risk index cannot be consistent with the choices of
all agents, which, arguably, limits the index’s objectiveness (even when the index satisfies
appealing axioms or some operative criterion for avoiding bankruptcy). However, our main
result shows that in various important decision problems, all agents rank all gambles in
the same way when deciding on short-term investments in gambles whose returns evolve
continuously in time. This finding enables us to construct objective risk indices that are
consistent with the short-term investment decisions of risk-averse agents.
There are pairs of gambles for which all risk-averse agents agree on which one of
the gambles is more desirable. This happens if one gamble second-order stochastically
dominates the other gamble. However, the well-known order of stochastic dominance
(Hadar & Russell, 1969; Hanoch & Levy, 1969; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1970) is only a
partial order and “most” pairs of gambles are incomparable. Interestingly, even if one
3Aumann & Serrano’s (2008) and Foster & Hart’s (2009) indices of risk have been extended to gambles
with an infinite support (Homm& Pigorsch, 2012; Schulze, 2014; Riedel & Hellmann, 2015) and to gambles
with uncertainty, i.e., unknown probabilities (Michaeli, 2014). These indices have also been applied to
study real-life investment strategies (Kadan & Liu, 2014; Bali et al., 2015; Anand et al., 2016; Leiss &
Nax, 2018).
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gamble second-order stochastically dominates another gamble, it is not sufficient for a
uniform ranking among all risk-averse agents in every decision problem (see, e.g., the
analysis of capital allocation decisions in Landsberger & Meilijson, 1993).
A large body of literature uses the classic mean-variance capital asset pricing model
(Markowitz, 1952; see Smetters & Zhang, 2013; Kadan et al., 2016 for recent exten-
sions). A well-known critique is that in a discrete-time setup the mean-variance prefer-
ences are consistent with expected utility maximization only under severe restrictions,
such as CARA utilities and normally distributed gambles (see, e.g., Borch, 1969; Feld-
stein, 1969; Hakansson, 1971). By contrast, the seminal results of Robert Merton (as
summarized and discussed in Merton, 1975, 1992) show that in a continuous-time model
with log-normally distributed asset prices mean-variance preferences are consistent with
the optimal portfolio allocation of all risk-averse agents. Merton’s results present an
important theoretical foundation for the classic model.
The present paper extends this idea by showing that the equivalence between the
decisions of agents with CARA utilities with respect to normally distributed gambles
and the decisions of risk-averse agents with respect to short-term investments holds more
broadly: (1) it holds with respect to various decision functions (i.e., the equivalence holds
beyond optimal portfolio allocation), and (2) it holds with respect to a broad class of
continuous-time processes (i.e., the equivalence holds beyond log-normally distributed
asset prices). On the other hand, our analysis is less general than Merton’s in that we
analyze situations in which the agent acts only at the beginning, at time zero, and cares
about his wealth at a single future nearby point t > 0, rather than allowing the agent to
act continuously in time.
Our paper is also related to the literature on local risks. This literature focuses on
discrete-time gambles, rather than continuous-time returns (which are the focus of the
present paper). Pratt (1964) shows that if the distribution of the returns is sufficiently con-
centrated, i.e., the third absolute central moment is sufficiently small relative to variance,
then for any decision maker, the magnitude of the risk premium depends on the local level
of the decision maker’s risk aversion. Samuelson (1970) shows that classic mean-variance
analysis, initiated by Markowitz (1952), applies approximately to all utility functions in
situations that involve what he calls “compact” distributions. More recently, Schreiber
(2015) shows that if one gamble is riskier than another gamble according to the Aumann
& Serrano’s index of risk, then every decision maker who is willing to accept a small
proportion of the riskier gamble is also willing to accept the same proportion of the less
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risky gamble.
In this context, two papers are close to the present paper: Shorrer (2014) and Schreiber
(2016). Shorrer (2014) shows that there exist risk indices that are, essentially, consistent
with the acceptance/rejection decisions of all risk-averse agents with respect to bounded
discrete gambles with sufficiently small support. This result is similar to our characteriza-
tion of risk indices that are consistent with various short-term investment decisions of all
risk-averse agents with respect to assets whose (possibly, unbounded) returns evolve con-
tinuously in time. Shorrer’s main result shows that by adding a few additional axioms, one
can uniquely choose Aumann & Serrano’s index among all the indices that are consistent
with agents’ acceptance/rejection with respect to small discrete gambles.4 In principle,
one could apply a similar axiomatic method to our three other decision functions; we leave
this interesting research direction for future research (for further discussion see Section
5). Unlike the other papers mentioned in this paragraph, Schreiber (2016) deals with
returns in the continuous-time setup. Specifically, he analyzes acceptance and rejection
of short-term investments. The key contributions of the present paper with respect to
Schreiber (2016) consists in, first, extending the analysis to the other three decision func-
tions (namely, capital allocation, optimal certainty equivalent, and risk premium) and,
second, showing in all four cases an equivalence to the indices in the exponential-normal
setup.
Structure In Section 2 we present our model. In Section 3 we analyze the benchmark
setup of CARA utilities and normally distributed gambles. In Section 4 we adapt the
model to study risky assets whose returns evolve continuously in time, and present our
main result. We conclude with a discussion in Section 5. In Appendix A extend our
model to multiplicative gambles. The formal proofs are presented in Appendix B.
2 Model
We consider an agent who has to make an investment decision related to a risky asset. In
what follows we define each of these three components: agent, risky asset, and investment
decision.
4Shorrer (2014) further applies analogous axioms in the related setup in which an agent has to ac-
cept/reject an option to allocate a certain amount of money in a multiplicative gamble, and other inter-
esting setups (beyond the scope of the present paper) that deal with acceptance/rejection decisions with
respect to cash flows and information transactions.
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A decision maker (or agent) is modeled as a pair (u,w), where u : R → R is a
von Neumann–Morgenstern utility function over wealth satisfying u′ > 0 (i.e., utility is
increasing in wealth) and u′′ < 0 (i.e., risk aversion), and w ∈ R is an initial wealth level.
Let DM denote the set of all such decision makers.
A gamble g is a real-valued random variable with a positive expectation and some
negative values (i.e., 0 < E [g], and P [g < 0] > 0). We think of a gamble as the additive
return on a risky investment; for example, if the initial investment is x dollars and the
random payoff from the investment is y dollars, then the additive return g ≡ y − x is a
gamble. Let G denote the set of all such gambles.
A decision function f : DM×G → R is a function that assigns to each agent and each
gamble a nonnegative number, where a higher value is interpreted as the agent finding
the gamble to be more attractive (i.e., less risky) for the relevant investment decision.
2.1 Decision Functions
We study four decision functions in the paper, each of which is related to a different aspect
of the gamble’s riskiness:
1. Acceptance/rejection: We consider a situation in which an agent faces a binary
choice between accepting and rejecting the gamble. Specifically, the acceptance
function fAR : DM× G → {0, 1} is given by
fAR ((u,w) , g) =
1 E [u (w + g)] ≥ u (w)0 E [u (w + g)] < u (w) .
That is, fAR ((u,w) , g) is equal to one if accepting the gamble yields a weakly higher
expected payoff than rejecting it, and it is equal to zero otherwise. The acceptance
function has already been used to study risk indices in various papers (e.g., Hart,
2011; Aumann & Serrano, 2008; Foster & Hart, 2009, 2013). In particular, our anal-
ysis of this decision function extends the analysis of Schreiber (2016), by showing the
similarity between this function in the mean-variance setup and the corresponding
decision function in the continuous-time setup.
2. Capital allocation: Second, we study a situation in which an agent has a continuous
choice of how much to invest in the gamble. Specifically, the capital (or asset)
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allocation function fCA : DM× G → R+ ∪ {∞} is given by
fCA ((u,w) , g) = arg max
α∈R+
E
[
u
(
w + αg
)]
; (1)
if Equation (1) does not admit of a solution (i.e., E
[
u
(
w + αg
)]
is increasing for
all α-s), then we set fCA ((u,w) , g) = ∞. That is, fCA ((u,w) , g) is the optimal
level the agent (u,w) chooses to invest in gamble g. An investment level of zero
is interpreted as no investment in the gamble. An investment level in the interval
(0, 1) is interpreted as a partial investment in the gamble. An investment level of
one is interpreted as a total investment in the gamble (without leverage). Finally,
an investment level strictly greater than one is interpreted as a more than total
investment in the gamble (achieved, for example, through high leverage). The cap-
ital allocation function is prominent in classic analyses of riskiness of assets (e.g.,
Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964), and, more recently, it has been used to derive an
incomplete ranking over the riskiness of gambles (Landsberger & Meilijson, 1993).
3. The optimal certainty equivalent: Third, we study a situation in which an agent has
to assess how much an opportunity to invest in the gamble g is worth to him (where
we allow the agent to choose his optimal investment level). Specifically, the optimal
certainty equivalent function fCE : DM× G → R+ ∪ {∞} is defined implicitly as
the unique solution to the equation
u (w + fCE) = max
α∈R+
E
[
u
(
w + α·g
)]
; (2)
if Equation (2) does not admit of a solution (which happens when E
[
u
(
w + α·g
)]
is
increasing for all α-s), then we set fCE =∞. That is, fCE ((u,w) , g) is interpreted
as the certain gain for which the decision maker is indifferent between obtaining
this gain for sure and having an option to invest in the gamble g, when the agent is
allowed to optimally choose his investment level in g. Observe that one can express
the RHS in (2) in terms of fCA and obtain the following equivalent definition of fCE
as the unique solution to the equation u (w + fCE) = E
[
u
(
w + fCA ((u,w) , g) · g
)]
.
The optimal certainty equivalent function has been studied in Hellman & Schreiber,
2018, in which an axiomatic analysis is used to define riskiness indices that are
relevant to this decision function.
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4. Risk premium: Lastly, we study a situation in which the agent has to decide between
investing in the gamble and obtaining a certain amount that is less than the gamble’s
expected payoff. Specifically, the risk premium function fRP : DM × G → R− ∪
{−∞} is defined implicitly as the unique solution to the equation
E [u (w + g)] = u (w + E [g] + fRP ) ; (3)
if such a solution does not exist then we set fRP ((u,w) , g) = −∞ . That is,
fRP ((u,w) , g) is interpreted as the negative amount that has to be added to the
expected value of the gamble, to make the agent indifferent between investing in
the gamble, and obtaining the gamble’s expected payoff plus this negative amount.
Here we use the common acceptation of risk premium in the economic literature
(Arrow, 1970; see Kreps, 1990, Section 3.2, for a textbook definition), which has a
somewhat different meaning in some of the finance literature (see Footnote 1).
In the main text we study additive gambles, in which the gamble’s realized outcome is
added to the initial wealth. In Appendix A we extend our model to multiplicative gambles,
in which the realized outcome of the gamble is interpreted as the per-dollar return.
2.2 Risk Indices
We define a risk index as a function Q : G → R++ that assigns to each gamble a positive
number, which is interpreted as the gamble’s riskiness. We study three specific risk indices
in the paper:
1. The variance-to-mean index QVM (g) is the ratio of the gamble’s variance to its
mean:
QVM (g) =
σ2 [g]
E [g] , where σ
2 [g] ≡ E
[
(g − E [g])2
]
.
2. The inverse Sharpe index QIS (g) is the ratio of the gamble’s standard deviation to
its mean:
QIS (g) =
σ [g]
E [g] .
3. The standard deviation index QSD (g) is equal to:
QSD (g) = σ [g] .
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We say that a risk index is consistent with a decision function over a domain of agents and
gambles, if: each agent in the domain finds gamble g less attractive than g′ with respect
to the relevant decision function iff the risk index of g is higher than in g′. Formally:
Definition 1. Risk index Q is consistent with decision function f over the domain DM×
G ⊆ DM× G if
Q (g) > Q (g′)⇔ f ((u,w) , g) < f ((u,w) , g′)
for each agent (u,w) ∈ DM and each pair of gambles g, g′ ∈ G.
Our definition of consistency is very restrictive and for a given domain of gambles and
decision makers it may not apply at all. In particular observe that a domain DM ×G ⊆
DM×G admits a consistent risk index iff all agents have the same ranking over gambles,
i.e., if
f ((u,w) , g) ≤ f ((u,w) , g′)⇔ f ((u′, w′) , g) ≤ f ((u′, w′) , g′)
for each pair of agents (u,w) , (u′, w′) ∈ DM and each pair of gambles g, g′ ∈ G.
Note that consistency is an ordinal (rather than cardinal) concept; i.e., a consistent risk
index is unique up to strictly monotone transformations; if risk index Q is consistent with
decision function f over the domainDM×G, then risk index Q′ is consistent with function
f over this domain iff there exists a strictly increasing mapping θ : Q (G)→ Q′ (G), such
that Q′ (g) = θ (Q (g)) for each gamble g ∈ G.
2.3 Risk-Aversion Indices
We define a risk-aversion index as a function φ : DM→ R++ that assigns to each agent a
non-negative number, which is interpreted as the agent’s risk aversion. We mainly study
one risk index in the paper, the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion, denoted
by ρ : DM→ R++, which is defined as follows:
ρ (u,w) = −u
′′ (w)
u′ (w) .
We say that a risk-aversion index is consistent with a decision function over a domain
of agents and gambles, if, for each gamble and each pair of agents in the domain, the agent
with the higher index of risk aversion chooses a lower value for his investment decision in
the gamble. Formally:
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Definition 2. Risk-aversion index φ is consistent with decision function f over the domain
DM ×G ⊆ DM× G if
φ (u,w) ≥ φ (u′, w′)⇔ f ((u,w) , g) ≤ f ((u′, w′) , g)
for each pair of agents (u,w) , (u′, w′) ∈ DM and each gamble g ∈ G.
Here again, the definition of consistency is very restrictive and for a given domain of
gambles and decision makers it may not apply at all. Specifically, a domain DM ×G ⊆
DM× G admits a consistent risk-aversion index iff all gambles induce the same ranking
over agents, i.e., if
f ((u,w) , g) ≤ f ((u′, w′) , g)⇔ f ((u,w) , g′) ≤ f ((u′, w′) , g′)
for each pair of agents (u,w) , (u′, w′) ∈ DM and each pair of gambles g, g′ ∈ G. Further,
like the consistency of a risk index, the consistency of any risk-aversion index is unique
up to a strictly monotone transformation.
3 Normal Distributions and CARA Utilities
3.1 Result
We begin by presenting a claim, which summarizes known results for normal distribu-
tions and CARA utilities. Specifically, Claim 1 shows that in each of the four decision
functions described above, all agents with constant absolute risk aversion have the same
ranking over all normally distributed gambles. Moreover, each of these rankings is con-
sistent with one of the three risk indices presented above (the asset allocation function
and the acceptance/rejection function induce the same ranking). Moreover, all normally
distributed gambles induce the same ranking over all agents with constant absolute risk
aversion, which is consistent with the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Formally, let DMCARA ⊆ DM be the set of decision makers with constant absolute
risk aversion (CARA utilities), i.e.,5
DMCARA =
{
(u,w) ∈ DM |∃ρ > 0, s.t. u (x) = 1− e−ρ·x
}
,
5Clearly, one can extend the definition of DMCARA (without affecting any of the results) by allowing
the utilities to differ from 1− e−ρ·x by adding a constant and multiplying by a positive scalar.
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and let GN ⊆ G be the set of normally distributed gambles with positive expectations,
i.e.,
GN = {g ∈ G|g ∼ Norm (µ, σ) , for some µ, σ > 0} .
Claim 1. Let u be a CARA utility with parameter ρ (i.e., u (x) = 1− e−ρ·x). Then:
1. fRP ((u,w), g) = −0.5 · ρ · σ2, which implies that the standard deviation index QSD
is consistent with the risk premium function fRP in the domain DMCARA ×GN .
2. (I)fAR((u,w), g) = 1 iff 0.5·ρ·σ2µ ≤ 1 and (II) fCA((u,w), g) = 1ρ · µσ2 , which imply that
the variance-to-mean index QVM is consistent with both the acceptance/rejection
function fAR and the capital allocation function fCA.
3. fCE((u,w), g) = 12·ρ ·
(
µ
σ
)2
, which implies that the inverse Sharpe index QIS is
consistent with the optimal certainty equivalent function fCE.
4. The Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion ρ is consistent with all four
decision functions fCA, fAR, fCE, and fRP in the domain DMCARA ×GN .
For completeness, we present the proof of Claim 1 in Appendix B.1.
3.2 Discussion
Each agent with CARA utility is described by two parameters (initial wealth w, and
Arrow–Pratt coefficient ρ). Similarly, each normal gamble is described by two parameters
(expectation µ and standard deviation σ). This implies that any decision function can be
expressed as a function g (w, ρ, µ, σ) of these four parameters.
Other Consistent Indices of Risk Aversion CARA utilities have the well-known
property that the initial wealth, essentially, does not affect expected utility calculations
with respect to investments in gambles. Thus, whenever the investment decision is made
by choosing the option that maximizes the agent’s expected utility (such as in all four
of the decision functions analyzed above and the standard certainty equivalent fSCE de-
scribed below), then the decision function is independent of w, which implies that the
risk-aversion parameter ρ is a consistent risk-aversion index. By contrast, for investment
decisions that are not determined by maximizing the agent’s expected utility, there might
be different risk-aversion consistent indices. For instance, Foster & Hart (2009) ana-
lyze a situation in which an agent accepts or rejects gambles while his goal is to avoid
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bankruptcy. The index of risk aversion that is consistent with their decision function is
the wealth level.
Separability Condition for Having a Consistent Risk Index The four decision
functions analyzed above have the additional separability property that each decision
function f can be represented as a product of two functions: one that depends only
on the parameters describing the agent (w and ρ), and one that depends only on the
parameters of the normal gamble, i.e., f ((u,w) , g) = f˜ (w, ρ, σ, µ) = h (w, ρ) · ν (µ, σ).
This separability implies that all agents with CARA utilities have the same ranking over
normal gambles (as this ranking depends only on ν (µ, σ), which does not depend on
the agent’s parameters), which, in turn, implies that there exists a consistent risk index.
Similarly, the separability implies that all normal gambles induce the same ranking over
agents (as this ranking depends only on h (w, ρ), which does not depend on the parameters
of the normal gamble).
Other decision functions might not satisfy this separability property. One example of
such a non-separable decision function is the standard certainty equivalent of a continuous
gamble fSCE (as opposed to the certainty equivalent of the optimal allocation of the
gamble fCE ((u,w) , g) discussed above), which is implicitly defined by
E [u(w + g)] = u(w + fSCE).
The definitions of fSCE and the risk premium fRP immediately imply that fSCE = E [g]+
fRP . Substituting fRP = −0.5 · ρ · σ2 (which is proven in Claim 1 for any agent with
CARA utility and any normal gamble) yields:
fSCE = E [g] + fRP = µ− 0.5 · ρ · σ2,
which is a non-separable function of ρ,µ, σ. The non-separability implies that agents with
different CARA utilities have different rankings for normal gambles and, therefore, no
risk index can be consistent with these decisions.
4 Short-Term Investments in Continuous Gambles
In what follows we adapt our model to short-term investment decisions regarding assets
whose value follows a continuous random process. Our description of the continuous-time
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setup follows Shreve (2004).
4.1 Continuous-Time Random Processes
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space on which a Brownian motion Wt is defined,6 with
an associated filtration F(t). Let the process g be described by the following stochastic
differential equation:
dgt = µtdt+ σtdWt, (4)
where the the drift µ and the diffusion σ are adapted stochastic processes (i.e., µt and
σt are F(t)-measurable for each t, see Shreve (2004, Footnote 1 on page 97)) are both
continuous in t. We assume that µ0 and σ0 are both strictly positive and that σt ≥ 0 for
all7 t > 0.
The process g is interpreted as the additive return of some risky asset. Specifically,
let Pt be the price of some risky asset at time t and assume that P0 is known. Then,
gt = Pt − P0,
is the additive return of the asset at time t. In particular, observe that g0 = Pt=0−P0 ≡ 0.
For simplicity we assume that g is bounded from below (i.e., there exists Mg ∈ R, such
that gt ≥Mg for each t > 0). Under these assumptions, for a sufficiently small time t, gt
is a gamble (see Footnote 9 in Appendix B.2); i.e., it has positive expectation and takes
negative values with positive probability. Thus, we can apply our definitions of decision
functions and indices to gt for each specific value of t > 0.
In our setup, a decision maker has to make a decision at time zero, where he cares
only about his wealth at some time t. From the perspective of this decision maker, P0 is
a pure number and gt is a gamble, just as before.
Let Γ denote the set of all continuous-time random processes satisfying these assump-
tions. Observe that the set Γ of continuous-time random processes is quite general. In
particular, it includes returns on assets whose prices are described by geometric Brow-
6For ease of exposition we limit the Wiener process to one dimension. All the results remain the same
with a multidimensional Wiener process with the corresponding adjustments.
7We also assume that E
∫ t
0 σ
2
sds and E
∫ t
0 |µs|ds are finite for every t > 0. This implies that the
integrals E
∫ t
0 σsdWs and E
∫ t
0 µds are well defined, and the Ito integral
∫ t
0 σsdWs is a martingale; see
Shreve (2004, Footnote 2 on page 143).
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nian processes (Black & Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1992, Chapters 4 and 5),8 and variants
of arithmetic Brownian processes and of mean-reverting processes that are bounded from
below (also known as Ornstein–Uhlenbeck processes; see, e.g., Merton, 1992, Chapter 5;
Hull & White, 1987; Meddahi & Renault, 2004), such as Cox et al.’s (1985) process for
modeling interest rate.
4.2 Adapted Definitions
We define a local-risk index at time zero as a function Ql : Γ→ R++ that assigns to each
process g ∈ Γ a positive number, which is interpreted as the process’s short-term riskiness
at t = 0. Given g ∈ Γ with initial parameters µ0 and σ0, we define three specific local-risk
indices (analogous to the corresponding definitions in Section 2.2):
1. The variance-to-mean local index QlV M(g) is the ratio of the process’s initial variance
to its initial mean:
QlV M (g) =
σ20
µ0
.
2. The inverse Sharpe local index QlIS(g) is the ratio of the gamble’s standard deviation
to its mean:
QlIS (g) =
σ0
µ0
.
3. The standard deviation local index QlSD(g) is equal to
QlSD (g) = σ0.
Given a continuous-time process g ∈ Γ, decision function f and agent (u,w) ∈ DM, let
f (u,w)g (t) ≡ f ((u,w) , gt) be the value of the decision function of agent (u,w) with respect
to an investment in g as a function of the duration of the investment t.
The following definition, which deals with general real-valued functions, will be useful
for defining the concept of consistency of indices in the continuous-time framework.
8When one models an asset’s price P by a geometric Brownian motion, then Pt (the asset value at
time t) obtains only positive values. In this case, the additive return is defined as the difference between
the asset’s value at time t and its initial value, i.e., gt = Pt−P0. Obviously, the additive return can obtain
both positive and negative values (for any time t > 0), which is consistent with our requirement that gt
be a gamble. Specifically, in the case of a geometric Brownian motion, dgt ≡ dpt = pt ·µ · dt+ pt ·σ · dW ,
which implies that µt = pt · µ and σt = pt · σ as in Equation (4).
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Definition 3. Let f, h : R+ ⇒ R, and assume that limt→0 f(t)h(t) is well defined. We say
that f is uniformly higher than h (around zero) and denote it by f >> h if (1) there
exists t¯ > 0, such that f (t) > h (t) for each t ∈
(
0, t¯
)
and (2)
lim
t→0
f (t)
h (t) 6= 1.
That is, f >> h if f (t) is strictly higher than h (t) for any sufficiently small t, and the
relative difference between the two functions does not become negligible (as measured by
the ratio f(t)
h(t) not converging to one) in the limit of t→ 0.
We say that a local-risk index is consistent with a decision function over continuous
returns, if the local-risk index of g′ is strictly lower than the local-risk index of g iff all
risk-averse agents find gamble gt uniformly more attractive than g′t with respect to any
short-term investment. Formally:
Definition 4. Local-risk index Ql : Γ → R+ is consistent with decision function f over
the set of continuous returns Γ if, for each pair of continuous-time processes g, g′ ∈ Γ and
each agent (u,w) ∈ DM, we have that
Ql (g) > Ql (g′)⇔ f (u,w)g >> f (u,w)g′ .
Note that a consistent risk index is unique up to strictly monotone transformations.
Similarly, we say that a risk-aversion index is consistent with a decision function over
continuous-time returns, if the risk-aversion index of agent (u,w) is strictly higher than
the risk-aversion index of (u′, w′) iff agent (u,w) finds all gambles uniformly less attractive
than agent (u′, w′). Formally:
Definition 5. Risk-aversion index φ : DM −→ R+ is consistent with decision function
f over the set of continuous returns Γ if, for each pair of agents (u,w) , (u′, w′) ∈ DM
and for each gamble g ∈ Γ, we have that
φ (u,w) > φ (u′, w′)⇔ f (u,w)g << f (u
′,w′)
g
Note that a consistent risk-aversion index is unique up to strictly monotone transforma-
tions.
16
4.3 Main Result
Our main result shows that in each of the decision functions described above, all agents
have the same ranking over all short-term continuous returns. Moreover, the rankings
are consistent with the three risk indices presented above, and they are the instantaneous
versions of the corresponding indices in the case of normally distributed gambles and
CARA utilities analyzed in Claim 1. Finally, we adapt to the present setup the classic
result that all continuous short-term returns induce the same ranking over all agents,
which is consistent with the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion (as in the
case of normally distributed gambles and CARA utilities). Formally:
Theorem 1. The following conditions hold over the domain of continuous short-term
decisions:
1. The standard deviation index QlSD is consistent with the risk premium function fRP .
2. The variance-to-mean index QlV M is consistent with the capital allocation function
fCA.
3. The inverse Sharpe index QlIS is consistent with the optimal certainty equivalent
function fCE.
4. The Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion ρ is consistent with decision
functions fCA, fCE, and fRP .
Sketch of proof; formal proof is presented in Appendix B.2. The value of an asset with a
continuous-time return g after a sufficiently small time t is represented by a gamble gt
for which the magnitudes of all high moments are small relative to the magnitude of
the second moment. Assuming random variables of this type allows us to use Taylor
expansion to approximate the decision functions, and to obtain the consistent risk indices
(which turn out to coincide with the indices in the case of normally distributed gambles
and CARA utilities).
Recall that limt→0 σ
2[gt]
t
= σ20 and limt→0
µ[gt]
t
= µ0, which implies for sufficiently small
t-s that σ2 [gt] ≈ t · σ20 and µ [gt] ≈ t · µ0. We begin with a standard approximation of the
risk premium function fRP (see, e.g., Eeckhoudt et al., 2005, Chapter 1). Recall that the
risk premium was defined implicitly as
E [u (w + gt)] = u (w + E [gt] + fRP ) .
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A second-order Taylor expansion of the left-hand side around w + E[gt] yields
E [u (w + gt)] ≈ E
[
u (w + E [gt]) + u′(w + E[gt])(gt − E[gt]) + 12u
′′ (w + E [gt]) (gt − E[gt])2
]
=u (w + E [g]) + 12u
′′ (w + E [gt])σ2 [gt] .
A first-order Taylor expansion of the right-hand side around w + E[g] yields
u (w + E [gt] + fRP ) ≈ u (w + E [gt]) + u′ (w + E [gt]) · fRP .
Combining these equations and isolating fRP yields
fRP ≈ 12
u′′ (w)
u′ (w) σ
2 [gt] ≈ 12
u′′ (w)
u′ (w) t · σ
2
0,
which implies that the standard deviation index QlSD = σ0 (resp., the Arrow–Pratt co-
efficient ρ=−12 u
′′(w)
u′(w) ) is a consistent risk index (resp., risk-aversion index) for decision
function fRP .
In order to analyze fCA, we define C (α) = (fRP (α · gt) + E[α · gt]) to be the certainty
equivalent of investment α in gt. Substituting the value of fRP calculated above we get
C (α) ≈ α212
u′′ (w)
u′ (w) σ
2 [gt] + α · E[gt].
In order to maximize C (α), we compare the derivative to zero, to get
∂C (α)
∂α
= 0 ⇔ α∗ · u
′′ (w)
u′ (w) σ
2 [gt] + E[gt] = 0 ⇔ fCA = α∗ ≈ − E[gt]u′′
u′ σ
2 [gt]
≈ − µ0
u′′
u′ σ
2
0
,
which implies that the variance-to-mean index QlV M (resp., the Arrow–Pratt coefficient
ρ) is a consistent risk index (resp., risk-aversion index) for decision function fCA.
Finally, if we calculate fCE = C (α∗) = C (fCA) we get
fCE ≈
(
E[g]
u′′(w)
u′(w) σ
2 [gt]
)21
2
u′′ (w)
u′ (w) σ
2 [gt] +
E[gt]
−u′′(w)
u′(w) σ
2 [gt]
E[gt]
= 12
1
−u′′(w)
u′(w)
(
E[gt]
σ [gt]
)2
≈ 12
1
−u′′(w)
u′(w)
t ·
(
µ0
σ0
)2
,
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which implies that the inverse Sharp index QlIS (the Arrow–Pratt coefficient ρ) is a con-
sistent risk (risk aversion) index for decision function fCE.
Remark 1 (on why the indices in the continuous-time setup coincide with the indices
in the CARA-normal setup). The expressions that approximate the various functions in
the continuous-time setup consist of two elements: the coefficient of risk aversion with
respect to the initial wealth level, and a function of the first and second moment of the
“small” gamble. In the CARA-normal setup of Section 3, the risk-aversion coefficient is
constant over all wealth levels, and, thus, it is relevant also to large gambles. In addition,
the only moments that matter to an agent with CARA utility who invests in a normally
distributed gamble are the first two moments. To see that, recall that for CARA utility
u (with coefficient of risk aversion ρ) and normal gamble g,
E[u(w + g)] = E[1− e−ρ·(w+g)] = 1− e−ρE[w+g]+0.5ρ2σ2[g].
Therefore, it seems plausible that the expressions that represent the decision functions in
the CARA-normal setup, depend only on the first two moments, and, thus, they coincide
with the approximated decision functions that are relevant for short-term investments in
assets with continuous returns.
4.4 Weak Consistency for Acceptance/Rejection
The case of the the acceptance/rejection function fAR has been analyzed in Schreiber
(2016). As the function fAR has only two feasible values (0 or 1), it cannot admit of
consistent risk indices, as in many cases in which one gamble is riskier than another, an
agent may choose to reject both gambles (and his value of fAR of both gambles would be
zero). Nevertheless, one can define the milder notion of weak consistency, and show that
a corollary to Schreiber’s (2016) result is that the risk index QlV M is weakly consistent
with the acceptance/rejection function fAR.
A local-risk index is weakly consistent with a decision function over continuous returns
(and all agents), if each agent chooses a weakly lower value of his investment decision in
gamble gt relative to g′t for a sufficiently small t if the local risk of g is strictly higher than
the local risk of g′. Formally:
Definition 6. Local-risk index Ql : Γ → R+ is weakly consistent with decision function
f over the set of continuous returns Γ if for each agent (u,w) ∈ DM and each pair of
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continuous-time processes g, g′ ∈ Γ, there exists time t¯, such that, for each time t < t¯, we
have that
Ql (g) > Ql (g′)⇒ f ((u,w) , gt) ≤ f ((u,w) , g′t) .
Note that weak consistency does not restrict the agents’ choices when both gambles
have the same local-risk index. As a result, a weakly consistent risk index is unique
only up to weakly monotone transformations; i.e., if Q is a weakly consistent local-risk
index with decision function f over the set of continuous returns Γ, then risk index Q′ is
consistent with function f over this domain if there exists a weakly increasing mapping
θ : Q (G)→ Q′ (G), such that Q′ (g) = θ (Q (g)) for each g ∈ Γ. In particular, a constant
index is trivially a weakly consistent local-risk index of any decision function.
We say that a risk-aversion index is weakly consistent with a decision function over
continuous-time returns, if for each short-term return, an agent chooses a (weakly) higher
value for his investment decision in the asset relative to another agent’s decision if the
former agent’s risk aversion is smaller. Formally:
Definition 7. Risk-aversion index φ : DM −→ R+ is weakly consistent with decision
function f over the domain of short-term continuous gambles if for each continuous-time
process g ∈ Γ and each pair of agents (u,w) , (u′, w′) ∈ DM, there exists a time t¯, such
that, for each time t < t¯, we have that
φ (u,w) > φ (u′, w′)⇒ f ((u,w) , gt) ≤ f ((u′, w′) , gt) .
The following corollary, which is implied by Schreiber (2016, Theorems 2.2 & 3.3),
shows that the standard deviation index QlV M and the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute
risk aversion ρ are weakly consistent with the acceptance/rejection function fAR. For-
mally:
Corollary 1. The following conditions hold over the domain of continuous short-term
decisions:
1. The standard deviation index QlSD is weakly consistent with the acceptance/rejection
function fAR.
2. The Arrow–Pratt coefficient of absolute risk aversion ρ is weakly consistent with the
acceptance/rejection function fAR.
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4.5 Continuous-Time Processes with Jumps
The set of continuous-time gambles Γ analyzed in this paper does not allow for jumps. In
what follows we show that the absence of jumps is necessary for our main result. Specifi-
cally, we demonstrate that risk-averse agents rank continuous-time processes with jumps
differently, even for short-term investments, which rules out the existence of consistent
risk indices. Consider, for example, the acceptance/rejection function fAR (similar con-
clusions can be drawn for the other three decision functions). Hart (2011) observes that
there are many (discrete-time) gambles that are ranked differently by different risk-averse
agents, i.e., that there exist a pair of agents (u,w) , (u˜, w˜) and a pair of gambles h, h˜ such
that agent (u,w) accepts h and rejects h˜, while agent (u˜, w˜) accepts h˜ and rejects h (see
Hart 2011, Footnote 23, for a specific example).
Consider the following two compound Poisson processes g, g˜, where each has an initial
value of zero (i.e., g (0) = g˜ (0) = 0). The value of each process changes only when there
is a jump. The jumps arrive randomly according to a Poisson process, parameterized
by a rate of λ > 0. In process g the size of each jump is distributed according to the
distribution of gamble h, while in process g˜ each jump is distributed according to the
distribution of gamble h˜. Observe that for sufficiently short times t << 1
λ
the probability
of having two jumps till time t is negligible (O
(
(λ · t)2
)
), and the agent’s decision whether
to accept or to reject the gamble gt / g˜t essentially depends only on what may happen
after a single jump. The preferences of agents (u,w) , (u˜, w˜) with respect to the discrete-
time gambles h, h˜ imply that for any sufficiently short time t agent (u,w) accepts gt and
rejects g˜t , while agent (u˜, w˜) accepts g˜t and rejects gt. That is, the two risk-averse agents
have the opposite rankings over the gambles gt and g˜t, which rules out the existence of a
consistent risk index.
5 Conclusion
Our main result is that in four central decision problems all risk-averse agents have the
same (problem-dependent) ranking over short-term investments in risky assets whose
returns evolve continuously in time, and these rankings are represented by simple well-
known indices of risk. The indices obtained are the same as in the classic model of
CARA utilities and normally distributed gambles. Each problem relates to a different
dimension of risk, and, thus, its ranking is represented by a different risk index. Finally,
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adapting a classic result to the present setup, we show in all of the decision functions
analyzed above, the decisions of agents are consistent with their Arrow–Pratt coefficients
of absolute risk aversion (e.g., one agent invests more in a continuous risky asset iff he
has a lower coefficient of absolute risk aversion).
The proposed indices in our paper are all based on the first two moments. This is a
result of the known property of continuous stochastic processes for which higher moments
go quickly to zero as the time parameter goes to zero. Hence, multiple indices of risk
that do use higher moments might coincide with our indices when they are applied to
continuous-time processes and short-term investments. For instance, Schreiber (2016)
shows that the index of Aumann & Serrano (2008) and that of Foster & Hart (2009)
(which, in general, both depend on all moments of the gamble) coincide with the variance-
to-mean index QVM for continuous processes in the limit of t → 0, and Shorrer (2014)
shows that there is a continuum of risk indices (which depend also on higher moments)
that are consistent with acceptance/rejection decisions of agents with respect to small
discrete gambles. Indeed, under the assumption that returns evolve continuously in time,
the only relevant parameters for measuring risk are the first two moments. Our results
can be interpreted as characterizing a necessary condition for a plausible risk index,
namely, that a plausible risk index (with respect to one of the four decision functions
analyzed in the paper) should depend on the first two moments in the same way as
presented in our main result. We leave for future research the interesting question of
how to choose among the various risk indices that satisfy this necessary condition. One
possible direction for analyzing this question is the axiomatic approach applied in Shorrer
(2014) to acceptance/rejection decisions.
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A Multiplicative Gambles
In the main text we followed the recent literature of riskiness (initiated by Aumann &
Serrano, 2008 and Foster & Hart, 2009) and focused on decision problems with regard
to additive gambles in units of dollars. However, in most financial applications, it is
common to describe the returns of an asset in relative terms, namely, percentages (see,
e.g., Markowitz, 1959 and Merton, 1992), as this is the way in which returns are described
in practice in exchange markets. Hence, in this section we show that our results hold also
with regard to multiplicative returns.
In some sense, the difference between multiplicative and additive returns is only a
matter of presentation: if one invests x dollars in a multiplicative gamble r, one’s payoff
will be x(1 + r) dollars, and this is just the same payoff as if one invests in an additive
return of x ·r dollars. Nevertheless, we think that presenting the results for multiplicative
returns is important for two reasons: first, as argued in Schreiber (2014), each investment
might have two different aspects of riskiness, absolute and relative; given two assets, one
of them might be riskier in relative terms but less risky in absolute terms. Therefore it
is worthwhile to study the difference between multiplicative and additive returns in our
setup. As it turns out, this potential difference vanishes when focusing on short-term
investments and we derive in the multiplicative setup results analogous to those that we
have in the additive setup. Second, in many situations of decision making under risk,
the risk-free interest rate should be taken into account. Since the risk-free interest rate is
calculated in terms of percentages, it is natural to combine it in decision problems with
relative return, as we do here.
A.1 Adaptation to the Model
Let rf > 0 be the risk-free interest rate available for all investors. A multiplicative risky
asset (multiplicative gamble) r is a real-valued random variable with an expectation that is
greater than rf , and some negative values greater than −1, i.e., E [r] > rf , P [r < 0] > 0,
and r ≥ −1. We interpret r as the per-dollar return of the asset. Let R denote the set of
all multiplicative risky assets.
We adapt the definitions of the four decision functions to the case of multiplicative
gambles.
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1. The acceptance function fmAR : DM×R→ {0, 1} is given by
fmAR ((u,w) , r) =
1 E [u (w · (1 + r))] ≥ u (w · (1 + rf ))0 E [u (w · (1 + r))] < u (w · (1 + rf )) ,
where we consider a situation in which an agent faces a binary choice between
investing his entire wealth in a multiplicative gamble r and investing it in the riskless
asset with return rf .
2. The capital allocation function fmCA : DM×R→ R+ ∪ {∞} is given by
fmCA ((u,w) , r) = arg max
α∈R+
E
[
u
(
w · (1 + rf ) + α · w · (r − rf )
)]
; (5)
if Equation (5) does not admit of a solution (i.e., E
[
u
(
w · (1 + rf ) + α · w · (r − rf )
)]
is increasing for all α-s), then we set fmCA ((u,w) , r) =∞. This function deals with
a situation in which an agent decides on the optimal share α ≥ 0 of his wealth w
to invest in the multiplicative gamble r (where α > 1 can be induced by leverage),
where his remaining wealth is invested in the riskless asset.
3. The optimal certainty equivalent function fmCE : DM×R→ R+ ∪ {∞} is defined
implicitly as the unique solution to the equation
u (w · (1 + fmCE)) = max
α∈R+
E [u (w · (1 + rf ) + α · w · (r − rf ))]
≡ E
[
u
(
w(1 + rf ) + fmCA ((u,w) , r) · w · (r − rf )
)]
; (6)
if Equation (6) does not admit of a solution (i.e., E
[
u
(
w · (1 + rf ) + α · w · (r − rf )
)]
is increasing for all α-s), then we set fmCE ((u,w) , r) = ∞. This function describes
the rate of a constant return that is equivalent to investing optimally in a multi-
plicative gamble r, where the remaining wealth is invested in the riskless asset.
4. The risk-premium function fmRP : DM×R→ R− is defined implicitly as the unique
solution to the equation
E [u (w · (1 + r))] = u (w · (1 + E [r] + fmRP )) ,
where fmRP represents the constant (negative) return that makes the agent indifferent
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between investing all his wealth in the multiplicative gamble r and investing in an
asset with a constant return that is equal to the expectation of r plus fmRP .
LetRN ⊆ R be the set of normally distributed multiplicative gambles (defined analogously
to the definition of GN). The Arrow–Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion, denoted by
% : DM→ R++, is defined as follows:
% (u,w) = −w · u
′′ (w)
u′ (w) .
We adapt the three indices of risk in the main text to the multiplicative setup and the
existence of a risk-free interest rate. Specifically:
1. The variance-to-mean index QmVM (r) is equal to
QmVM (r) =
σ2 [r]
E [r]− rf , where σ
2 [r] ≡ E
[
(r − E [r])2
]
.
2. The inverse Sharpe index QmIS (r) is equal to
QmIS (r) =
σ [r]
E [r]− rf .
3. The standard deviation index QmSD (r) is equal to
QmSD (r) = σ [r] .
A.2 Adapted Results
The adaptation of Claim 1 and Theorem 1 to multiplicative gambles is as follows. Observe
that all the results remain the same, except that the Arrow–Pratt coefficient of relative
risk aversion replaces the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Claim 2. The following conditions hold over the domain DMCARA ×RN :
1. The standard deviation index QmSD is consistent with the risk premium function
fmRP .
2. The variance-to-mean index QmVM is consistent with both the capital allocation
function fmCA and the acceptance/rejection function fmAR.
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3. The inverse Sharpe index QmIS is consistent with the certainty equivalent function
fmCE.
4. The Arrow–Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion % is consistent with all four
decision functions: fmAR, fmCA, fmCE, and fmRP .
The proof of Claim 2 is made analogous to the corresponding proof in the additive
case by using the following identities (details are omitted for brevity):
1. fmAR((u,w), r) ≡ fAR((u,w(1 + rf )), w(r − rf ))
2. fmCA((u,w), r) ≡ fCA((u,w(1 + rf )), w(r − rf ))
3. fmCE((u,w), r) ≡ fCE((u,w(1 + rf )), w(r − rf ))/w
4. fmRP ((u,w), r) ≡ fRP ((u,w(1 + rf )), w(r − rf ))/w
Recall that in the continuous-time setup, the decision problems are parameterized by t,
which is the investment horizon. Previously, we assumed that a continuous-time random
process g represents the additive return of a financial investment. Now the continuous-
time random process r represents the excess multiplicative return: rt = (Pt − P0)/P0.
We assume that the compound risk-free interest rate is rf and hence the riskless return
over period t is rf (t) = eµf ·t − 1. The adapted definitions of the risk indexes in the
multiplicative setup for the local risk indices are as follows:
1. The variance-to-mean local index Ql,mVM(g) is equal to
Ql,mVM (g) =
σ20
µ0 − µf .
2. The inverse Sharpe local index Ql,mIS (g) is equal to
Ql,mIS (g) =
σ0
µ0 − µf .
3. The standard deviation local index Ql,mSD(g) is equal to
Ql,mSD (g) = σ0.
The analogous result to Theorem 1 is as follows.
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Theorem 2. The following conditions hold over the domain of continuous short-term
decisions with respect to multiplicative gambles:
1. The standard deviation index Ql,mSD is consistent with the risk premium function fmRP .
2. The variance-to-mean index Ql,mVM is consistent with the capital allocation function
fmCA, and it is weakly consistent with the acceptance/rejection function fmAR.
3. The inverse Sharpe index Ql,mIS is consistent with the certainty equivalent function
fmCE.
4. The Arrow–Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion % is consistent with decision
functions: fmCA, fmCE, and fmRP , and it is weakly consistent with fmAR.
The proof of Theorem 2 is made analogous to the corresponding proof in the additive
case by using the following identities (details are omitted for brevity):
1. fmAR((u,w), rt) ≡ fAR((u,w(1 + rf (t))), w(rt − rf (t)))
2. fmCA((u,w), rt) ≡ fCA((u,w(1 + rf (t))), w(rt − rf (t)))
3. fmCE((u,w), rt) ≡ fCE((u,w(1 + rf (t))), w(rt − rf (t)))/w
4. fmRP ((u,w), rt) ≡ fRP ((u,w(1 + rf (t))), w(rt − rf (t)))/w
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Claim 1
The following well-known fact, which describes the expectation of a log-normal distribu-
tion, will be useful in our proofs (the standard proof, which relies on the Laplace transform
of the normal distribution, is omitted for brevity; see, e.g., Forbes et al., 2011, page 132).
Fact 1. If y is normally distributed with expectation µ and standard deviation σ, then
E [ey] = eµ+0.5σ2 .
Next, we prove Claim 1. Let g be a normally distributed random variable with ex-
pectation µ and standard deviation σ. Let u be a CARA utility with parameter ρ, i.e.,
u (x) = 1− e−ρ·x. Let w be the arbitrary initial wealth.
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1. QSD and ρ are consistent with fRP . The risk premium x is defined implicitly by
E [u (w + g)] = E
[
1− e−ρ(w+g)
]
= u (w + E [g] + x) = 1− e−ρ(w+µ+x)
⇔ 1− E
[
e−ρ(w+g)
]
= 1− e−ρ(w+µ+x) ⇔ E
[
e−ρ(w+g)
]
= e−ρ(w+µ+x).
By Fact 1
E
[
e−ρ(w+g)
]
= e−ρ(w+µ)+0.5ρ2σ2 ,
which implies
e−ρ(w+µ)+0.5ρ
2σ2 = e−ρ(w+µ+x) ⇔ −ρ(w+µ)+0.5ρ2σ2 = −ρ(w+µ+x)⇔ x = 0.5ρσ2.
Thus, fRP ((u,w) , g) = 0.5ρσ2, which implies that QSD = σ is a consistent risk
index (and that ρ is a consistent risk-aversion index with respect to fRP .
2. QVM and ρ are consistent with fAR. The agent accepts the gamble iff
E
(
1− e−ρ(w+g)
)
> E
(
1− e−ρw
)
which, by Fact 1 is equivalent to
e−ρ(w+µ)+0.5ρ
2σ2 < e−ρw ⇔ 0.5ρ < µ
σ2
.
Thus, fAR ((u,w) , g) = 1{0.5ρ< µ
σ2}, which implies that QVM =
σ2
µ
is a consistent
risk index (and that ρ is a consistent risk-aversion index) with respect to fAR.
3. QVM and ρ are consistent with fCA. The capital allocation function is given by
fCA ((u,w) , g) = arg max
α∈R+
E
[
u
(
w + αg
)]
= arg max
α∈R+
E
[
1− e−ρ
(
w+αg
)]
.
It follows from Fact 1 that the r.h.s. of the above equation is equivalent to
arg max
α∈R+
E
[
1− e−ρ
(
w+αg
)]
= arg max
α∈R+
(
1− e−ρw−ραµ+0.5ρ2α2σ
)
= arg min α∈R+
(
−ραµ+ 0.5ρ2α2σ
)
.
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The first-order condition is
−µ+ ρα∗σ = 0⇔ α∗ = 1
ρ
µ
σ2
.
Thus, fCA ((u,w) , g) = 1ρ
µ
σ2 , which implies that QVM =
σ2
µ
is a consistent risk index
(and that ρ is a consistent risk-aversion index) with respect to fCA.
4. QIS and ρ are consistent with fCE. The optimal certainty equivalent function is
given by
1− e−ρ(w+fCE) = u (w + fCE) = E
[
u
(
w + fCA ((u,w) , g) · g
)]
= E
[
u
(
w + 1
ρ
µ
σ2
· g
)]
= E
[
1− e−ρ·
(
w+ 1
ρ
µ
σ2 ·g
)]
= 1− e−ρw−µ
2
σ2+0.5
µ2
σ2 ,
where the last equality uses Fact 1. This implies that
1−e−ρ(w+fCE) = 1−e−ρw−µ
2
σ2+0.5
µ2
σ2 ⇔ −ρ (w + fCE) = −ρw−µ
2
σ2
+0.5µ
2
σ2
⇔ fCE = 12ρ
µ2
σ2
.
Thus, fCE ((u,w) , g) = 12ρ
µ2
σ2 , which implies that QIS =
σ
µ
is a consistent risk index
(ρ = ρ is a consistent risk-aversion index) with respect to fCE.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The following three lemmas will be useful in our proofs. The first lemma is a simple
version of Ito’s well-known lemma (see, e.g., Shreve, 2004, Equation 4.4.24).
Lemma 1 (Ito’s lemma). Let s (t) be a random process described by dst = µtdt+ σtdW .
Let f(t, s) be a twice-differentiable function; then
df =
(
µt
∂f
∂s
+ 0.5σ2t
∂2f
∂s2
+ ∂f
∂t
)
dt+ ∂f
∂s
σtdW.
The next two lemmas are standard calculus results.
Lemma 2. Let Ft(y) be a set of real-valued, continuous, and weakly increasing functions,
with 0 < t ≤ T and y ∈ R. Assume that there exists a continuous and strictly increasing
function F (y) such that (1) ∀y, F (y) = limt→0 Ft(y), and (2) ∃y∗, s.t. F (y∗) = 0. Then,
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there exists t¯ > 0 s.t.
∀t < t¯ ∃yt s.t. Ft(yt) = 0, and lim
t→0 yt = y
∗.
Proof. Let δ > 0. We have to show that there exists t¯ s.t. ∀t < t¯ there is a value yt
satisfying |yt − y∗| < δ and Ft(yt) = 0. Since F (y) is strictly increasing there exists a
positive number C such that F (y∗ − δ) < −C and F (y∗ + δ) > C. Condition (1) implies
that there exists t¯ s.t. ∀t < t¯,
|Ft(y∗ + δ)− F (y∗ + δ)| < C, and
|Ft(y∗ − δ)− F (y∗ − δ)| < C.
Hence, Ft(y∗ − δ) < 0 and Ft(y∗ + δ) > 0. Since Ft is continuous, ∃yt ∈ (y∗ − δ, y∗ + δ)
s.t. Ft(yt) = 0.
Lemma 3. Let Ft(α) be a set of twice-differentiable strictly concave functions where
0 < t ≤ T and α ∈ R, and let F be a twice-differentiable strictly concave function such
that (1) ∀α, F (α) = limt→0 Ft(α), and (2) ∃α∗ ∈ R such that α∗ = arg maxα∈R F (α).
Then, there exists t¯ > 0 such that
∀t < t¯,∃αt ∈ R s.t. αt = arg max
α
Ft(α), and lim
t→0 αt = α
∗.
Proof. We have to show that, given δ > 0, there exists t¯ > 0 such that ∀t < t¯, ∃αt, which
maximizes Ft(α), and that |αt−α∗| < δ. Let δ1 = min{F (α∗)−F (α∗−δ), F (α∗)−F (α∗+
δ)}. There exists t¯ s.t. ∀t < t¯,
|Ft(α∗)− F (α∗)| < δ1/3
|Ft(α∗ + δ)− F (α∗ + δ)| < δ1/3
|Ft(α∗ − δ)− F (α∗ − δ)| < δ1/3.
Hence, ∀t < t¯,
Ft(α∗) > Ft(α∗ − δ) and Ft(α∗) > Ft(α∗ + δ).
Since for all t, Ft is weakly concave, there exists αt ∈ (α∗−δ, α∗−δ), which is the argmax
of Ft.
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Next, we prove the main theorem. Let g ∈ Γ be a continuous-time random process,
and let (u,w) ∈ DM be a decision maker.
1. QlSD and ρ are consistent with fRP . For every t > 0, let Ft be the function defined
as follows:
Ft(x) =
u
(
w + E [gt] + x · t
)
− E
[
u
(
w + gt
)]
t
.
By definition, if for some value of x, Ft(x) = 0, then x · t = fRP ((u,w) , gt). To
calculate the limit of Ft as t goes to zero, it is simpler to look at Ft as the difference
between two functions kt and ht, defined by
kt(x) =
u(w + E [gt] + x · t)− u(w)
t
,
and
ht =
E
[
u
(
w + gt
)]
− u(w)
t
. (7)
Clearly,
Ft(x) = kt(x)− ht
for every value of x. The limit of kt(x) as t goes to zero is simply the derivative
with respect to t at w:
lim
t→0 kt(x) = u
′(w) · (µ0 + x). (8)
By applying Ito’s lemma
ht =
E
[∫ t
0
(
µqu
′
q + 12σ
2
qu
′′
q
)
dq
]
t
+
E
[∫
u′qσqdW
]
t
,
where u′q ≡ du(wq)/d(wq), u′′q ≡ du2(wq)/d2(wq), and wq = w+gq. Since we assumed
that g is bounded from below, the concavity and monotonicity of u implies that u′q
is bounded. In addition, we assumed that the σt satisfies the square-integrability
condition and, therefore, that E
[ ∫ t
0 σ
2
qdq
]
is finite. These two assumptions imply
that E
[ ∫ t
0(u′qσq)2dq
]
is finite and, therefore, that
∫ t
0 u
′
qσtdW is a martingale; see
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Shreve (2004, Theorem 4.3.1. on page 134). Hence, ht can be rewritten as follows:
ht =
E
[∫ t
0
(
µqu
′
q + 12σ
2
qu
′′
q
)
dq
]
t
.
According to the mean-value theorem for integration, for each realization of g there
exists some x ∈ (0, t) for which
∫ t
0
(
µqu
′
q + 12σ
2
qu
′′
q
)
dq
t
= µxu′x +
1
2σ
2
xu
′′
x.
As t goes to zero this expression converges to µ0u′(w) + 12σ
2
0u
′′(w). Since for every
realization of g it converges to the exact same number, the expectation of this
expression also converges to this number. Therefore,
lim
t→0 ht = µ0u
′(w) + 12σ
2
0u
′′(w). (9)
It follows from Equations (8) and (9) that
F (x) ≡ lim
t→0Ft(x) = u
′(w)x− 12σ
2
0u
′′(w).
Let x∗ be the real number s.t. F (x∗) = 0, i.e.,
x∗ = 12
u′′(w)
u′(w) σ
2
0.
It is easy to see that the two conditions of Lemma 2 are satisfied: for all t, first Ft
is continuous as it is the sum of continuous functions, and second, Ft is a strictly
increasing function since u is an increasing function. It follows from the lemma that
there exists t¯ and xt such that Ft (xt) = 0 for each t < t¯, and
lim
t→0 xt = x
∗,
where, by definition, fRP ((u,w) ,gt) = xtt. Note that since u
′′(w)
u′(w) is negative, x
∗ is
negative as well, and therefore x∗ (and x∗ · t for all t > 0) is strictly decreasing with
ρ = −u′′(w)
u′(w) and with Q
l
SD = σ0.
Next, we would like to show that QlSD and ρ are consistent with fRP . We begin
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by showing that QlSD(g) > QlSD(g′) implies that (fRP )
(u,w)
g << (fRP )
(u,w)
g′ for any
(u,w) ∈ DM. Fix a decision maker (u,w), and let x∗(g) ≡ x∗ ((u,w) , g) (and use
a similar notation for xt(g)). Let g, g′ ∈ Γ be two processes satisfying QlSD(g) >
QlSD(g′). Then x∗(g) < x∗(g′), and from the fact that xt → x∗it follows that there
exists t¯ > 0, such that for each t ∈
(
0, t¯
)
, xt(g) · t < xt(g′) · t, which implies that
fRP ((u,w) , gt) < fRP ((u,w) , g′t). In addition,
limt→0
fRP ((u,w) , gt)
fRP ((u,w) , g′t)
= limt→0
xt (gt) t
xt (g′t) t
= x
∗ (g)
x∗ (g′) =
(
QlSD(g)
)2
(
QlSD(g′)
)2 6= 1,
which proves that (fRP )(u,w)g << (fRP )
(u,w)
g′ . Similarly, we show that ρ (u′, w′) >
ρ (u′′, w′′) implies that (fRP )(u
′,w′)
g << (fRP )
(u′′,w′′)
g for any g ∈ Γ. Fix a process
g ∈ Γ, and let x∗(u,w) ≡ x∗ ((u,w) , g) (and use a similar notation for xt(u,w)).
Let (u′, w′) , (u′′, w′′) ∈ DM be two agents satisfying ρ (u′, w′) > ρ (u′′, w′′). Then
x∗ (u′, w′) < x∗ (u′′, w′′), and from the fact that xt → x∗ it follows that there exists
t¯ > 0, such that for each t ∈
(
0, t¯
)
, xt(u′′, w′′) · t < xt(u′, w′) · t, implying that
fRP ((u′′, w′′) , gt) < fRP ((u′, w′) , gt). In addition,
limt→0
fRP ((u′′, w′′) , gt)
fRP ((u′, w′) , gt)
= limt→0
xt (u′′, w′′) t
xt (u′, w′) t
= x
∗ (u′′, w′′)
x∗ (u′, w′) =
ρ (u′′, w′′)
ρ (u′, w′) 6= 1,
which proves that (fRP )(u
′,w′)
g << (fRP )
(u′′,w′′)
g .
For the other direction, given some agent (u,w), if for two processes g and g′ there
is some t¯ s.t. fRP ((u,w) , gt) < fRP ((u,w) , g′t) for every 0 < t < t¯, and the
ratio fRP ((u,w) , gt) /fRP ((u,w) , g′t) does not go to 1 when t goes to zero, then
xt < x
′
t for all t < t¯, implying that the limits also satisfy x∗ < x′∗ and, therefore,
σ0 > σ
′
0. Similarly, given some process g, if for two agents (u′, w′) and (u′′, w′′) there
is some t¯ s.t. fRP ((u′, w′) , gt) < fRP ((u′′, w′′) , gt) for every 0 < t < t¯, and the
ratio fRP ((u,w) , gt) /fRP ((u′, w′) , gt) does not go to 1 when t goes to zero, then
x∗ < x′∗, implying that (u′, w′) is locally more averse to risk than (u′′, w′′).
2. QlV M and ρ are consistent with fCA. The capital allocation function is defined by
fCA ((u,w) , gt) = arg max
α∈R+
E
[
u
(
w + α · gt
)]
,
where fCA ((u,w) , gt) equals infinity if there is no internal solution. For every t > 0,
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let Ft be the function defined as follows:
Ft(α) =
E
[
u
(
w + αgt
)]
− u(w)
t
. (10)
By Ito’s lemma,
Ft(α) =
E0
[∫ t
0 αµqu
′
q + 12α
2σ2qu
′′
q dq
]
t
+
E
[ ∫ t
0 αu
′
qσqdW
]
t
,
where u′q ≡ du(wq)/d(wq), u′′q ≡ du2(wq)/d2(wq), and wq = w + αgq. For the same
reason as in the case of fRP , the expression on the right-hand side E
[ ∫ t
0 αu
′
qσqdW
]
is zero and therefore it can be omitted.
We define F (α) to be the limit of Ft(α) as t goes to zero. For the same reason as
in the case of fRP it equals to:
F (α) ≡ lim
t→0Ft(α) = αµ0u
′(w) + 12α
2σ20u
′′(w). (11)
We denote by α∗ the value of α that maximizes F (α):
α∗ = arg max
α
F (α) = − u
′(w)
u′′(w)
µ0
σ20
. (12)
The two conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied: first, by definition, the limit of Ft is
F . Second, we represent Ft as the sum of two expressions
Ft(α) =
α · Eo
[∫ t
0 µqu
′
qdq
]
t
+
α2 · Eo
[
1
2
∫ t
0 σ
2
qu
′′
q dq
]
t
.
Since we assume that u′′ is negative, Ft is strictly concave with α and the second
condition of the lemma is satisfied.
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By the lemma, there exists t¯ > 0 such that αt maximizes Ft for all t < t¯, and9
lim
t→0 αt = α
∗.
Note that the limit α∗ is strictly decreasing with ρ = −u′′(w)/u′(w), and with
QlV M = σ20/µ0.
Next we would like to show that QlV M and ρ are consistent with fCA, where by
definition fCA ((u,w) , gt) = (fCA)(u,w)g (t) = αt((u,w) , gt). For the first direction,
we have to show that if for two processes g, g′ ∈ Γ , QlV M(g) > QlV M(g′), then
(fCA)(u,w)g << (fCA)
(u,w)
g′ . Indeed, QlV M(g) > QlV M(g′) implies that α∗(g) < α∗(g′),
and from the convergence of αt it follows that there exists t¯ > 0, such that for each
t ∈
(
0, t¯
)
, αt(g) < αt(g′). Since α∗(g) < α∗(g′), it follows that limt→0 αt(g)/αt(g′) 6=
1 and therefore that (fCA)(u,w)g << (fCA)
(u,w)
g′ . Similarly, if for two agents (u′, w′)
and (u′′, w′′), ρ (u′, w′) > ρ (u′′, w′′), then α∗(u′, w′) < α∗(u′′, w′′), and from the
convergence of αt it follows that there exists some t¯ > 0, such that for each
t ∈
(
0, t¯
)
, αt(u′, w′) < αt(u′′, w′′). Since α∗ (the limit of αt) is positive, it follows
that limt→0 αt(u′, w′)/α(u′′, w′′) 6= 1 and therefore that (fCA)(u
′,w′)
g << (fCA)
(u′′,w′′)
g .
For the other direction, let g, g′ ∈ Γ be two processes for which, for any deci-
sion maker (u,w), (fCA)(u,w)g << (fCA)
(u,w)
g′ . Indeed, the limits of fCA ((u,w) , gt)
and fCA ((u,w) , g′t) when t goes to zero satisfy α∗(g′) > α∗(g) and, therefore,
QlV M(g) > QlV M(g′). Similarly, let (u,w) and (u′, w′) be two decision makers
for which (fCA)(u
′,w′)
g << (fCA)
(u′′,w′′)
g . Indeed, the limits of fCA ((u,w) , gt) and
fCA ((u,w) , g′t) when t goes to zero satisfy α∗(u′, w′) < α∗(u′′, w′′) and, therefore,
ρ (u′, w′) > ρ (u′′, w′′).
3. QlIS and ρ are consistent with fCE. For every t > 0, let Ft be the function defined
9The analysis implies that gt is a “gamble” for each t < t¯. To see that, note that we have shown
that for every process g, and for every strictly concave utility function, there exists t¯ such that for every
t < t¯, the solution of the maximization problem is internal. This implies that for every such t, E[gt] > 0.
Otherwise, a risk-averse agent would be better off by choosing αt = 0, contradicting our result here that
αt > 0 for a sufficiently short time t. Similarly, the analysis implies that P (gt < 0) > 0 for a sufficiently
short time t. Otherwise, for every αt and  > 0, (αt. + ) gt would first-order stochastically dominate
αtgt and therefore any agent would be better off enlarging any given αt., which implies that the solution
is not internal, contradicting our result that some finite αt > 0 maximizes Ft. These two properties of gt
imply that gt is a gamble.
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as follows:
Ft(z) =
u(w + z · t)− E
[
u
(
w + αgt
)]
t
.
It is easy to see that if α is the optimal allocation and Ft(z) = 0 then z · t =
fCA((u,w) , gt). To calculate the limit of Ft as t goes to zero, it is simpler to look
at Ft as the difference between two functions kt and ht, defined by
kt(z) =
u(w + zt)− u(w)
t
, and
ht =
E
[
u
(
w + αgt
)]
− u(w)
t
. (13)
Clearly,
Ft(z) = kt(z)− ht
for every value of z. The limit of kt(z) as t goes to zero is simply the derivative:
lim
t→0 kt(z) = u
′(w) · z.
Using Ito’s lemma, and taking the limit (as we did in Equations 10 and 11), we get
lim
t→0 ht = αµ0u
′(w) + 12α
2σ20u
′′(w).
Recall that according to Equation (12),
α∗ = − u
′(w)
u′′(w)
µ0
σ20
.
Plugging α = α∗ into ht, we get
lim
t→0 ht = −
(u′ (w))2 µ20
u′′ (w)σ2 +
1
2
(u′ (w))2 µ20
u′′ (w)σ2 = −
1
2
(u′ (w))2 µ20
u′′ (w)σ2 .
We define F (z) to be the limit of Ft(z), where t goes to zero:
F (z) ≡ lim
t→0Ft(z) = limt→0 kt(z)− limt→0 ht(z) = u
′(w)z + 12
(u′0)2
u′′0
(µ0
σ0
)2
.
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We define z∗ to be the value that results in F (z∗) = 0:
z∗ = −12
u′(w)
u′′(w)
(µ0
σ0
)2
.
For every t, Ft(z) is continuous and strictly increasing satisfying the conditions of
Lemma 2, therefore by the lemma there is t¯ such that Ft(zt) = 0 for every t ∈ (0, t¯),
implying that zt ·t is the certainty equivalent of the optimal investment in the gamble
with horizon t, and that
lim
t→0 zt = z
∗.
It is easy to see that z∗ (and therefore z∗t for all t) is strictly decreasing with
ρ = −u′′(w)
u′(w) and with Q
l
IS = σµ .
Next, we would like to show that QlIS and ρ are consistent with fCE. We begin
by showing that QlIS(g) > QlIS(g′) implies that (fCE)
(u,w)
g << (fCE)
(u,w)
g′ for any
(u,w) ∈ DM. Fix a decision maker (u,w), and let z∗(g) ≡ z∗ ((u,w) , g) (and use
a similar notation for zt(g)). Let g, g′ ∈ Γ be two processes satisfying QlIS(g) >
QlIS(g′). Then z∗(g) < z∗(g′), and from the fact that zt → z∗ it follows that there
exists t¯ > 0, such that for each t ∈
(
0, t¯
)
, zt(g) · t < zt(g′) · t, which implies that
fCE ((u,w) , gt) < fCE ((u,w) , g′t). In addition,
limt→0
fCE ((u,w) , gt)
fCE ((u,w) , g′t)
= limt→0
zt (gt) t
zt (g′t) t
= z
∗ (g)
z∗ (g′) =
(
QlIS(g)
)2
(
QlIS(g′)
)2 6= 1,
which proves that (fCE)(u,w)g << (fCE)
(u,w)
g′ . Similarly, we show that ρ (u′, w′) >
ρ (u′′, w′′) implies that (fCE)(u
′,w′)
g << (fCE)
(u′′,w′′)
g for any g ∈ Γ. Fix a process
g ∈ Γ, and let z∗(u,w) ≡ z∗ ((u,w) , g) (and use a similar notation for zt(u,w)).
Let (u′, w′) , (u′′, w′′) ∈ DM be two agents satisfying ρ (u′, w′) > ρ (u′′, w′′). Then
z∗ (u′, w′) < z∗ (u′′, w′′), and from the fact that zt → z∗ it follows that there exists
t¯ > 0, such that for each t ∈
(
0, t¯
)
, zt(u′′, w′′) · t < zt(u′, w′) · t, implying that
fCE ((u′′, w′′) , gt) < fCE ((u′, w′) , gt). In addition,
limt→0
fCE ((u′′, w′′) , gt)
fCE ((u′, w′) , gt)
= limt→0
zt (u′′, w′′) t
zt (u′, w′) t
= z
∗ (u′′, w′′)
z∗ (u′, w′) =
ρ (u′′, w′′)
ρ (u′, w′) 6= 1,
which proves that (fCE)(u
′,w′)
g << (fCE)
(u′′,w′′)
g .
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For the other direction, given some agent (u,w), if for two processes g and g′ there
is some t¯ s.t. fCE ((u,w) , gt) < fCE ((u,w) , g′t) for every 0 < t < t¯, and the
ratio fCE ((u,w) , gt) /fCE ((u,w) , g′t) does not go to 1 when t goes to zero, then
xt < x
′
t for all t < t¯, implying that the limits also satisfy z∗ < z′∗ and, therefore,
σ0 > σ
′
0. Similarly, given some process g, if for two agents (u′, w′) and (u′′, w′′) there
is some t¯ such that fCE ((u′, w′) , gt) < fCE ((u′′, w′′) , gt) for every t ∈
(
0, t¯
)
, and
the ratio fCE ((u′′, w′′) , gt) /fCE ((u′, w′) , gt) does not go to 1 when t goes to zero,
then z∗ < z′∗, implying that (u′, w′) is locally more averse to risk than (u′′, w′′).
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